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Abstract
Oblivious transfer is the cryptographic primitive where Alice sends one of two bits to Bob
but is oblivious to the bit received. Using quantum communication, we can build oblivious
transfer protocols with security provably better than any protocol built using classical commu-
nication. However, with imperfect apparatus one needs to consider other attacks. In this paper
we present an oblivious transfer protocol which is impervious to lost messages.
1 Introduction
Quantum information allows us to perform certain cryptographic tasks which are impossible us-
ing classical information alone. In 1984, Bennett and Brassard gave a quantum key distribution
scheme which is unconditionally secure against an eavesdropper [May01, LC99, PS00]. This led
to many new problems including finding quantum protocols for other cryptographic primitives
such as coin-flipping and oblivious transfer.
Coin-flipping is the cryptographic primitive where Alice and Bob generate a random bit over a
communication channel. We discuss two kinds of coin-flipping protocols, weak coin-flippingwhere
Alice wants outcome 0 and Bob wants outcome 1, and strong coin-flipping where there are no
assumptions on desired outcomes. We define weak coin-flipping below.
Definition 1.1 (Weak coin-flipping (WCF)). A weak coin-flipping protocol, denoted WCF, with
cheating probabilities (AWCF, BWCF) and bias εWCF is a protocol with no inputs and output c ∈ {0, 1}
satisfying:
• if Alice and Bob are honest, they output the same randomly generated bit c;
• AWCF is the maximum probability dishonest Alice can force honest Bob to accept the outcome c = 0;
• BWCF is the maximum probability dishonest Bob can force honest Alice to accept the outcome c = 1;
• εWCF := max{AWCF, BWCF} − 1/2.
The idea is to design protocols which protect honest parties from cheating parties and there
are no security guarantees when both parties are dishonest. We can assume neither party aborts
in a WCF protocol. If, for instance, Alice detects Bob has cheated then she may declare herself the
winner, i.e., the outcome is c = 0. This is not the case in strong coin-flipping since there is no sense
of “winning.”
∗Department of Combinatorics & Optimization and Institute for Quantum Computing, University of Waterloo. Ad-
dress: 200 University Ave. W., Waterloo, ON, N2L 3G1, Canada. Email: jwjsikor@uwaterloo.ca.
1
Definition 1.2 (Strong coin-flipping (SCF)). A strong coin-flipping protocol, denoted SCF, with
cheating probabilities (ASCF, BSCF) and bias εSCF is a protocol with no inputs and output c ∈ { 0, 1, abort }
satisfying:
• if Alice and Bob are honest, then they never abort and they output the same randomly generated bit
c ∈ {0, 1};
• ASCF is the maximum probability dishonest Alice can force honest Bob to accept some outcome c = a,
over both choices of a ∈ {0, 1};
• BSCF is the maximum probability dishonest Bob can force honest Alice to accept some outcome c = b,
over both choices of b ∈ {0, 1};
• εSCF := max{ASCF, BSCF} − 1/2.
We note here that SCF protocols can be used asWCF protocols. The only issue is if the outcome
is “abort”. In this case, the party who detected the cheating announces themselves the winner.
Doing this, the bias in the WCF protocol is the same as in the SCF protocol.
Aharonov, Ta-Shma, Vazirani, and Yao [ATVY00] first showed the existence of an SCF protocol
with bias εSCF < 1/2 followed shortly by Ambainis [Amb01] who showed an SCF protocol with
bias εSCF = 1/4. As for lower bounds, Mayers [May97], Lo, and Chau [LC97] showed that bias
εSCF = 0 is impossible. Kitaev [Kit03], and later Gutoski andWatrous [GW07], extended this result
to show that the bias of any SCF protocol satisfies εSCF ≥ 1/
√
2− 1/2. This bound was proven
to be tight by Chailloux and Kerenidis [CK09] who showed the existence of protocols with bias
εSCF < 1/
√
2 − 1/2+ δ for any δ > 0.
As for WCF protocols, it was shown that the bias could be less than Kitaev’s bound. For
example, the protocols in [SR02, KN04, Moc05] provide biases of εWCF = 1/
√
2− 1/2, εWCF =
0.239, and εWCF = 1/6, respectively. The best known lower bound for WCF is by Ambainis
[Amb01] who showed that a protocol with bias εWCF must use Ω(log log(1/εWCF)) rounds of
communication. Then, in a breakthrough result, Mochon [Moc07] showed the existence of WCF
protocols with bias εWCF < δ for any δ > 0.
Oblivious transfer is the cryptographic primitive where Alice sends to Bob one of two bits but
is oblivious to the bit received. We define oblivious transfer and its notions of cheating below.
Definition 1.3 (Oblivious transfer (OT)). An oblivious transfer protocol, denoted OT, with cheating
probabilities (AOT, BOT) and bias εOT is a protocol with inputs satisfying:
• Alice inputs two bits (x0, x1) and Bob inputs an index b ∈ {0, 1};
• when Alice and Bob are honest they never abort, Bob learns xb perfectly, Bob gets no information
about xb¯, and Alice gets no information about b;
• AOT is the maximum probability dishonest Alice can learn b without Bob aborting the protocol;
• BOT is the maximum probability dishonest Bob can learn x0⊕ x1 without Alice aborting the protocol;
• εOT = max{AOT, BOT} − 1/2.
When a party cheats, we only refer to the probability which they can learn the desired values
without the other party aborting. For example, when Bob cheats, we do not require that he learns
either bit with probability 1.
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In the OT definition above there can be different ways to interpret the bias. For example, we
could consider worst-case choices over inputs, we could assume the inputs are chosen randomly,
etc. The protocol construction given in this paper is independent of how the inputs are chosen so
this is not an issue.
Like weak coin-flipping, oblivious transfer has a related primitive which is useful for the anal-
ysis in this paper.
Definition 1.4 (Randomized oblivious transfer (Random-OT)). A randomized oblivious transfer
protocol, denoted Random-OT, with cheating probabilities (AROT, BROT) and bias εROT is a protocol with
no inputs satisfying:
• Alice outputs two randomly generated bits (x0, x1) and Bob outputs two bits (b, xb) where b ∈ {0, 1}
is independently, randomly generated;
• when Alice and Bob are honest they never abort, Bob gets no information about xb¯, and Alice gets no
information about b;
• AROT is the maximum probability dishonest Alice can learn b without Bob aborting the protocol;
• BROT is the maximum probability dishonest Bob can learn x0⊕ x1 without Alice aborting the protocol;
• εROT = max{AROT, BROT} − 1/2.
We note here that a protocol is considered fair if the cheating probabilities for Alice and Bob
are equal and unfair otherwise.
OT is an interesting primitive since it can be used to construct secure two-party protocols
[EGL82], [Cre´87], [Rab81]. It was shown by Lo [Lo97] that εOT = 0 is impossible. This result
was improved by Chailloux, Kerenidis, and Sikora [CKS10] who showed that every OT protocol
satisfies εOT ≥ 0.0586.
Various settings for oblivious transfer have been studied before such as the bounded-storage
model [DFSS08] and the noisy-storage model [Sch10]. In this paper, we study only information
theoretic security but we allow the possibility of lost messages (more on this below). Oblivious
transfer has a rich history, has various definitions, and has many names such as the set membership
problem [JRS02] or private database querying [JSG+10].
A loss-tolerant protocol is a quantum cryptographic protocol which is impervious to lost mes-
sages. That is, neither Alice nor Bob can cheat more by declaring that a message was lost (even
if it was received) or by sending blank messages deliberately. We prefix a protocol with “LT-” to
indicate that it is loss-tolerant.
The idea of loss-tolerancewas first applied to strong coin-flipping by Berlin, Brassard, Bussieres,
and Godbout in [BBBG08]. They showed a vulnerability in the best known coin-flipping protocol
construction by Ambainis [Amb01]. They circumvented this problem and presented an LT-SCF
protocol with bias εSCF = 0.4. Aharon, Massar, and Silman generalized this protocol to a family of
LT-SCF protocols with bias slightly smaller at the cost of using more qubits in the communication
[AMS10]. Chailloux added an encryption step to the protocol in [BBBG08] to improve the bias
to εSCF = 0.359 [Cha10]. The best known protocol for LT-SCF is by Ma, Guo, Yang, Li, and Wen
[MGY+11] who use an EPR-based protocol which attains a bias of εSCF = 0.3536. It remains an
open problem to find the best possible biases for LT-WCF and LT-SCF. In fact, we do not even
know if there is an LT-WCF protocol with bias less than the best possible bias for LT-SCF; they
may in fact share the same smallest possible bias.
The first approach to designing loss-tolerant oblivious transfer protocols was by Jakobi, Simon,
Gisin, Bancal, Branciard, Walenta, and Zbinden [JSG+10]. They designed a loss-tolerant protocol
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for private database querying which is also known as “1-out-of-N oblivious transfer.” The pro-
tocol is not technically an oblivious transfer protocol (using the definition in this paper) since an
honest Bob may receive too much information. However, it is practical in the sense that it is se-
cure against the most evident attacks. The backbone of their protocol is the use of a quantum key
distribution scheme. This differs from the loss-tolerant protocol in this paper which is based on
weak coin-flipping.
The results of this paper
We first present a protocol in Section 2 and prove it is not loss-tolerant. Then, in Section 3, we
show how to build LT-OT protocols from LT-WCF and LT-Random-OT protocols. Namely, we
prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1.5. Suppose there exists an LT-WCF protocol with cheating probabilities (AWCF, BWCF) and
bias εWCF and an LT-Random-OT protocol with cheating probabilities (AROT, BROT) and bias εROT. Then
there exists an LT-OT protocol with cheating probabilities
AOT = AWCF |AROT − BROT|+min{AROT, BROT},
BOT = BWCF |AROT − BROT|+min{AROT, BROT}.
This protocol has bias
εOT ≤ |AROT − BROT|+min{AROT, BROT} − 1/2 = εROT.
We have εOT < εROT when εWCF < 1/2 and AROT 6= BROT. Furthermore, the OT protocol is fair when
the LT-WCF protocol is fair.
In Subsection 3.4, we show the existence of an unfair LT-Random-OT protocol with cheating
probabilities (AROT, BROT) = (1, 1/2). Combining this with the fact that there is a fair LT-WCF
protocol with bias εWCF = 0.3536 [MGY
+11] we get the following corollary.
Corollary 1.6. There exists a fair LT-OT protocol with bias εOT = 0.4268.
2 An example of a Random-OT protocol that is not loss-tolerant
In this section, we examine a protocol for Random-OT and show it is not loss-tolerant. This pro-
tocol has the same vulnerability as the best known coin-flipping protocol constructions based on
bit-commitment, see [BBBG08] for details.
Protocol 2.1 (A Random-OT protocol [CKS10])).
(i) Bob randomly chooses b ∈ {0, 1} and sends Alice half of the two-qutrit state
|φb〉 := 1√
2
|bb〉+ 1√
2
|22〉 .
(ii) Alice randomly chooses x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1} and applies the following unitary to the qutrit
|0〉 → (−1)x0 |0〉 , |1〉 → (−1)x1 |1〉 , |2〉 → |2〉 .
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(iii) Alice returns the qutrit to Bob. Bob now has the two-qutrit state
(−1)xb√
2
|bb〉+ 1√
2
|22〉 .
(iv) Bob performs the measurement {Π0 := |φb〉〈φb|, Π1 := 1 −Π0} on the state.
(v) If the outcome is Π0 then xb = 0. If the outcome is Π1 then xb = 1.
(vi) Any lost messages are declared and the protocol is restarted from the beginning.
It has been shown in [CKS10] that Bob can learn x0 ⊕ x1 with probability 1 and Alice can
learn b with maximum probability 3/4. However, this does not take into account “lost-message
strategies.” We now show such a strategy and how Alice can learn b perfectly. Suppose Alice
measures the first message in the computational basis. If she sees outcome “0” or “1” then she
knows Bob’s index b with certainty. If the outcome is “2” then she replies to Bob, “Sorry, your
message was lost.” Then they restart the protocol and Alice can measure again. Eventually, Alice
will learn b perfectly proving this protocol is not loss-tolerant.
This protocol illustrates another interesting point about the design of OT protocols. One may
not be able to simply change the amplitudes in the starting states to balance the cheating proba-
bilities. For example, if we were to change the amplitudes in |φb〉, then Bob would have a nonzero
probability of getting the wrong value for xb. Thus, balancing an unfair OT protocol is not as
straightforward as it can be in coin-flipping.
3 Constructing loss-tolerant oblivious transfer protocols
In this section, we prove Theorem 1.5 by constructing an LT-OT protocol from an LT-WCF protocol
and a (possibly unfair) LT-Random-OT protocol. In doing so, we have to overcome some issues
that are not present when designing LT-SCF protocols. These issues include:
• it is not always possible to simply reset a protocol with inputs;
• balancing the cheating probabilities can be difficult;
• it is not possible to switch the roles of Alice and Bob since Bob must be the receiver;
• an honest party must not learn extra information about the other party’s inputs (or outputs
in the case of Random-OT).
We deal with these issues by reducing the problem one step at a time. First we reduce the task
of finding LT-OT protocols to finding LT-Random-OT protocols in Subsection 3.1. Then we build
an LT-Random-OT protocol from an LT-WCF protocol and two (possibly unfair) LT-Random-OT
protocols in Subsection 3.2. In Subsection 3.3, we show how to create the two LT-Random-OT pro-
tocols from a single LT-Random-OT protocol. Finally, we show an unfair LT-Random-OT protocol
in Subsection 3.4 to prove Corollary 1.6.
3.1 Equivalence between LT-OT protocols and LT-Random-OT protocols with re-
spect to bias
Having a protocolwith inputs is an issuewhen building protocols loss-tolerantly. In recent LT-SCF
protocols, if messages were lost for any reason, then the protocol is simply restarted at some point,
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but this is not always an option with OT because the inputs could have context, e.g., Alice’s bits
could be database entries. For this reason, we cannot simply “reset” them and repeat the protocol.
To remedy this issue, we use Random-OT.
It is well known that OT and Random-OT share the same cheating probabilities, i.e., if there ex-
ists an OT protocol with cheating probabilities (AOT, BOT) = (x, y) then there exists a Random-OT
protocol with cheating probabilities (AROT, BROT) = (x, y), and vice versa. For completeness, we
show these reductions and prove they preserve loss-tolerance.
Protocol 3.1 (LT-Random-OT from LT-OT).
(i) Alice randomly chooses x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1} and Bob randomly chooses b ∈ {0, 1}.
(ii) Alice and Bob input the choices of bits above into the LT-OT protocol so that Bob learns xb.
(iii) Alice outputs (x0, x1) and Bob outputs (b, xb).
It is straightforward to see that this reduction preserves the loss-tolerance of the LT-OT proto-
col since we are only restricting how the inputs are chosen. More interesting is the reduction from
LT-Random-OT to LT-OT.
Protocol 3.2 (LT-OT from LT-Random-OT).
(i) Alice and Bob decide on their desired choices of inputs to the LT-OT protocol.
(ii) Alice and Bob use an LT-Random-OT protocol to generate the output (x0, x1) for Alice and (b, xb)
for Bob.
(iii) Bob tells Alice if his output bit b is equal to his desired index. If it is not equal, Bob changes it and
Alice switches her two bits.
(iv) Alice tells Bob which of her two bits (x0, x1) are equal to her desired inputs. Alice and Bob flip their
outcome bits accordingly.
This reduction is a way to derandomize the outputs of the LT-Random-OT protocol. We see
that this also preserves the loss-tolerance of the LT-Random-OT protocol since classical informa-
tion can simply be resent if lost in transmission.
Using the reductions above, we have reduced the task of finding LT-OT protocols to finding
LT-Random-OT protocols.
3.2 Creating LT-Random-OT protocols
There is a simple construction of an SCF protocol with bias ε ≈ 3/4 and it proceeds as follows.
Alice and Bob first use a WCF protocol with bias ε ≈ 0. The “winner” gets to flip a coin to
determine the outcome of the SCF protocol. Of course, a dishonest player would like to “win” the
WCF protocol since then they have total control of the SCF outcome.
We mimic this idea to create a protocol prototype for LT-Random-OT and discuss why it does
not work.
Protocol 3.3 (A protocol prototype).
(i) Alice randomly chooses two bits (x0, x1) and Bob randomly chooses an index b ∈ {0, 1}.
(ii) Alice and Bob perform an LT-WCF protocol with bias εWCF to create random c ∈ {0, 1}.
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(iii) If c = 0, then Bob sends b to Alice. Alice then replies with xb.
(iv) If c = 1, then Alice sends (x0, x1) to Bob.
This protocol has bias εROT < 1/2 if εWCF < 1/2. However, the problem is that honest Alice
learns b with probability 3/4 when Bob is honest. This is simply not allowed in a Random-OT
protocol because honest Alice should never obtain any information about b. Honest Bob learns
x0 ⊕ x1 with probability 3/4, which is also not allowed since he should only learn x0 or x1. This
illustrates another issue when designing OT and Random-OT protocols.
To remedy this problem, instead of Alice and Bob revealing their bits entirely, they can use
(possibly unfair) LT-Random-OT protocols. We present a modified version of the protocol below.
Protocol 3.4 (An LT-Random-OT protocol).
(i) Alice and Bob perform an LT-WCF protocol with cheating probabilities (AWCF, BWCF) and bias εWCF
to create random c ∈ {0, 1}.
(ii) If c = 0, then Alice and Bob generate their outputs using an LT-Random-OT protocol with cheating
probabilities (AROT, BROT) = (x, y), where x ≥ y.
(iii) If c = 1, then Alice and Bob generate their outputs using an LT-Random-OT protocol with cheating
probabilities (AROT, BROT) = (y, x).
(iv) Alice and Bob abort if and only if either LT-Random-OT protocol is aborted.
We now prove that this LT-Random-OT protocol has cheating probabilities equal to those in
Theorem 1.5. We show it for cheating Alice as the case for cheating Bob is almost identical. Since
x ≥ y, Alice would prefer the outcome of the WCF protocol to be c = 0. She can force c = 0 with
probability AWCF and in this case she can learn b with probability x. If c = 1, she can learn b with
probability y. Letting A′ROT be the amount she can learn b in the protocol above, we have
A′ROT = AWCF x+ (1− AWCF) y = AWCF (x− y) + y.
All that remains to prove Theorem 1.5 is to show that an LT-Random-OT protocol with cheat-
ing probabilities (AROT, BROT) = (α, β) implies the existence of an LT-Random-OT protocol with
cheating probabilities (AROT, BROT) = (β, α), for any α, β ∈ [1/2, 1]. This way, we can just set
x = max{α, β} and y = min{α, β}.
3.3 Symmetry in LT-Random-OT protocols
Suppose we have an LT-Random-OT protocol with cheating probabilities (AROT, BROT) = (α, β),
for some α, β ∈ [1/2, 1]. We now show how to create an LT-Random-OT protocol with cheating
probabilities (AROT, BROT) = (β, α). The trick is to switch the roles of Alice and Bob.
Protocol 3.5 (A Random-OT protocol (randomized version of a protocol in [WW06])).
(i) Alice and Bob use an LT-Random-OT protocol with cheating probabilities (AROT, BROT) = (α, β)
except that Bob is the sender and Alice is the receiver. Let Alice’s output be (b, xb) and let Bob’s
output be (x0, x1).
(ii) Alice randomly chooses d ∈ {0, 1} and sends d⊕ xb to Bob.
(iii) Alice outputs (x′0, x
′
1) = (d, d⊕ b) and Bob outputs (b′,m) = (x0 ⊕ x1, d⊕ xb ⊕ x0).
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(iv) Alice and Bob abort if and only if the LT-Random-OT protocol is aborted.
Notice this protocol is loss-tolerant since classical messages can be resent if lost in transmission.
We can write Bob’s outputm as d⊕ xb⊕ x0 = d⊕ bb′. Thus, if b′ = 0 thenm = d = x′0 and if b′ = 1
then m = d⊕ b = x′1. Therefore Bob gets the correct value for x′b′ . Since x′0 ⊕ x′1 = d⊕ (d⊕ b) = b,
honest Bob gets no information about Alice’s other bit and cheating Bob can learn x′0 ⊕ x′1 with
maximum probability α. Since b′ = x0⊕ x1, honest Alice gets no information about b′ and cheating
Alice can learn b′ with maximum probability β. Therefore, (AROT, BROT) = (β, α) as desired. Since
b, x0, x1, and d are all randomly generated, so are x
′
0, x
′
1, and b
′ making this a valid LT-Random-OT
protocol.
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.5.
3.4 An unfair LT-Random-OT protocol
We present here an LT-Random-OT protocol with cheating probabilities (AROT, BROT) = (1/2, 1).
Note that even though this protocol has bias εROT = 1/2, it can be used to create a protocol with
smaller bias using recent LT-WCF protocols and Theorem 1.5.
Protocol 3.6 (An unfair LT-Random-OT protocol).
(i) Bob randomly chooses an index b ∈ {0, 1} and another random bit d ∈ {0, 1}.
(ii) Bob sends Alice the qubit Hb |d〉.
(iii) Alice randomly chooses x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1} and applies the unitary Xx0Zx1 to the qubit.
(iv) Alice returns the qubit to Bob which is in the state Xx0Zx1Hb |d〉 = Hb |xb ⊕ d〉 (up to global phase).
(v) Bob has a two-outcome measurement (depending on b and d) to learn xb perfectly.
(vi) If any messages are lost the protocol is restarted from the beginning.
We see that this is a valid Random-OT protocol. Firstly, because honest Bob learns xb and gets
no information about xb¯ (since H
b |xb ⊕ d〉 does not involve xb¯). Secondly, Alice cannot learn any
information about b, even if she is dishonest, since the density matrices for b = 0 and b = 1 are
identical. Therefore AROT = 1/2. This protocol is loss-tolerant concerning cheating Alice since b
and d are reset if any messages are lost so Alice cannot accumulate useful information. It is also
loss-tolerant concerning cheating Bob since he can already learn both of Alice’s bits perfectly. He
can do this by first sending Alice half of
|Φ+〉 = 1√
2
|00〉+ 1√
2
|11〉 .
Each choice of (x0, x1) corresponds to Bob having a different Bell state at the end of the protocol.
From this, x0 and x1 can be perfectly inferred, yielding BROT = 1.
4 Conclusions and open questions
We have designed a way to build LT-OT protocols by using an LT-WCF protocol to help balance
the cheating probabilities in a (possibly unfair) LT-Random-OT protocol. This protocol uses well
known reductions betweenOT and Random-OT and the reduction to switch the roles of Alice and
Bob.
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The construction in this paper is robust enough to design OT protocols with other definitions
of cheating Bob. Suppose that Bob wishes to learn f (x0, x1) where f 6= XOR is some functionality.
In this case, we may not be able to switch the roles of Alice and Bob in a way that switches the
cheating probabilities as in Subsection 3.3. However, instead of just using one LT-Random-OT pro-
tocol and creating another from it, we could have just as easily used two different LT-Random-OT
protocols (with a consistent notion of cheating Bob).
A limitation of this protocol design is that is uses LT-Random-OT protocols as subroutines.
Even if LT-WCF protocolswith bias εWCF ≈ 0 are constructed, using the protocols in Subsection 3.4
can reduce the bias to only εOT ≈ 1/4. It would be interesting to see if there exists an LT-OT
protocol with cheating probabilities (AOT, BOT) = (α, β) where α + β < 3/2.
An open question is to show if using more LT-WCF subroutines can help improve the bias.
In [CK09], many WCF protocols were used to drive the bias of a SCF protocol down towards the
optimal value of 1/
√
2− 1/2. Can something similar be done for OT or LT-OT?
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